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Creating Capitalism: Politics, Reforms and Economic Performance 
 
An Econometric analysis of six countries from 1989-1999 
 




Building on a model that integrates reforms into exogenous and endogenous growth models, 
this paper designs an econometric model of the interplay between economic reform measures, 
political decisions and economic performance. Several key hypotheses about transition are tested 
using two-stage least squares on a logit model using data for six countries (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia) over their first ten years of freedom.  
We draw three conclusions from the empirical evidence. (1) Contrary to the litany that 
everyone favors reforms, we find that voting for strong reform parties leads to more reforms. (2) 
History matters, even in a model of forward looking rational agents. Where communism was 
relatively popular, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria, reform is slower, more problematic, and aimed 
toward a welfare state not US-style capitalism. The cost of debunking communist ideology 
evidently slows progress considerably. (3) Better economic performance does not result quickly 
from reforms. From a public choice perspective the immediate identifiable social costs of reforms 
often appear stronger than the eventual diffuse benefits. Though not surprising this result does not 
auger well for reformers.   
Finally, critical macroeconomic data for the earlier years around the transition period are 
very poor quality. Indeed economic data seems to be too poor to reveal much about changing 
economic circumstance. Measured output may actually move in the opposite direction of realized 
output.  International agencies could contribute greatly to analysis of transition by quickly and 
deeply engaging the local statistical agencies. 






Creating Capitalism: Politics, Reforms and Economic Performance 
An econometric analysis of six newly independent countries from 1989—1999 
Frank C. Wykoff 
To assess reform progress toward growth empirically requires an econometric model linking 
voting decisions, economic reforms and economic performance. In the model developed here 
politics influences economics and economics influences politics. We briefly review the 
integration of five generic economic reforms (price liberalization, property privatization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization and industry restructuring and deregulation) into 
the growth model framework.
1 
In section 2 we link analysis of growth and reforms to voting behavior. Next we model the 
relationship between decisions by voters, proposals by reformers and election outcomes.
2 Finally, 
we model an intertemporal sequence linking historical economic performance and proposed 
reforms to decisions by voters in elections. We also argue that reform regimes carry the effects of 
the past on to contemporary economic performance. Reform regimes follow from election 
outcomes and votes for reformers depend on prospective reforms. Thus we encounter possible 
simultaneous equation bias. We model this in section 3.  
Before dealing with data we analyze in section 4 the concern that votes do not reflect 
pocketbook issues. Some people choose not to vote at all and others vote for non-economic 
reasons. We model this problem employing analysis from the labor market supply literature. 
In section 5 we explain construction of the variables for reform and voting to be used in 
subsequent analysis.
3 We begin the empirical analysis in section 6 with a model using simple 
(crude) binomial (0 - 1) dummy variables for voting and reforms. Section 7 reports on 
increasingly sophisticated estimation techniques using indexes of reform and percentages of votes 
                                                            
1 The five reforms come from Blanchard et. al. (1992). The companion paper, modified Appendix A, 
contains the growth model analytics and the relation between reforms and growth. 
2 Modeling voting, reform and economics is explained in Dillon and Wykoff (2001).  
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and seats as variables. This section contains ordinary least squares and two-stage least 
squares models. We sum up with conclusions about voting, reforms and economic performance 
that we derive from the empirical research. 
1. Reforms and the growth model 
We summarize here the influence reforms will have on the representative consumer in a 
growth model. Six sets of forces that express behavior of consumers, producers, and government 
and the constraints they each face, carry reform measures into the computation of economic 
prospects. We summarize these functions, the profit function, the utility function, the consumer 
budget constraint, the producer production and technology constraint and the government 
spending policies and its budget constraint, in Illustration 1.
4  
    Illustration 1. Behavioral and constraint functions 
 
   Profit  function:   
      Π0 = t=0∫
t=∞[f(kht) - (wt + vtkht )]e 
-rtdt 
 
   Production  function: 




    Utility function (case of constant elasticity of substitution):  
    U 0 = t=0∫
t=∞ u(cht)e
-ρtdt   where σ  ≡  [-u’/cu’’]  
 
  Consumer’s budget constraint: 
    y ht = wt + (1 - z)vtkht - τht. 
 
    Government budget constraint (balanced budget policy): 
    g ht = τht + zv tkht 
 
 
We summarize in Illustration 2 below the nature of the steady state equations. Some reforms 
operate on these conditions and do not appear in the behavioral and constraint equations.  
 
    Illustration 2. Steady state conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 See Appendix C in Dillon and Wykoff (2001) for details on data.  
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 Euler  condition: 
    c •ht/cht = σ[(ρ + δ + η+γ) - (1-zv)α] 
  
    The modified golden rule 
     ∂yht/∂kht = (ρ + γ + η + δ)/(1-zα) 
 
    The dynamic path of capital 
    k •ht = yht – [ght + cht + (γ + δ + η)]kht ] 
 
Steady state output 
    y t* = yet*H t* = yet*κe
ϕµ(At/Lt)
 γNt 
    
    Steady state consumption 
    c h* = yh* -[gh + (γ + δ + η)kh*] 
  
  Each reform has specific effects on the steady state, either by altering the path of steady 
state values of certain variables (changes in growth rates) or by altering the level of variables on 
the steady state paths (level effects). Since all of this is discussed in Appendix A, we merely 
summarize these effects here with the help of the equations in illustration 1 and 2.  
Price liberalization raises the steady state level of utility associated with each level of 
consumption.  This increase in utility reflects the improved mix of consumption goods resulting 
from a market-driven price set that reflects consumer preferences rather than prices administered 
by a central agency.
5  
  Property privatization, operating on the incentives of producers and savers, alters many 
aspects of the behavioral relations and the steady state conditions. Individual producers, after 
privatization, are the residual claimants of the profit function. This alone has many consequences 
for production, employment, capital acquisition and the path of capital at the steady state. Thus, 
we expect privatization to improve productive efficiency through many channels. Private property 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 These equations are taken from companion paper, modified Appendix A. All symbols are defined in 
Appendix A. 
5 In growth models the only good is consumption. No distinction is made between different goods in the 
consumption bundle. The only choice consumers have is between consumption and saving (that leads to 
capital formation and future consumption). Nonetheless empirically consumption must be represented by 
some aggregate index of consumer goods. It is in altering the mix of the goods that comprise the underlying 
index toward those chosen by consumers that will increase utility from any given quantity of aggregate 
consumption. See Blanchard and Fischer (1989).  
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also influences the behavior of consumers, because they become the residual claimants of 
savings. We identify, therefore, three distinct effects of property privatization on production. (1) 
It jolts output upward for each mix of inputs. (This effect acts like a one-time positive Hicks 
neutral technological shock.) (2) It also alters the nature of the production function itself by 
causing a more efficient production process. These two effects are a direct result of creating a 
private residual claimant. Both operate directly on af(kh) where “a” is the rate of Hicks neutral 
technological change.
6 (3) Private investors will purchase or produce higher quality capital. Thus, 
we would expect lower depreciation rates for every type of fixed capital (structures, machinery 
and equipment).
7 The depreciation rate δ enters the Euler condition, the modified golden rule and 
the dynamic path of capital at the steady state.  
Private market economies tend to be more dynamic than administered systems. Thus, we 
believe privatization will increase the rate of technological change. This effect alters the growth 
rate at the steady state through the Harrod neutral parameter γ.
8  The behavior of private 
individuals will also change when they become residual claimants of private property. Knowing 
that one’s savings will result in high rates of return implies savings rates will rise. The subjective 
rate of time discount, ρ, will fall as well since people will have more confidence in gains from 
sacrifice of contemporary consumption for saving, i.e., saving has a higher rate of return. This 
parameter enters the Euler condition. Finally, if privatizing encourages savings, then it will also 
increase the rate of accumulation of effective education and skill development. Two parameters 
of steady state output, under a human capital model, ϕ and µ, will rise. Recall that ϕ represents 
the level of education and µ is the effect on productivity of education. 
                                                            
6 While Harrod neutral is used in the modeling for tractability purposes, we prefer Hicks neutral here 
because it is a simple one-time shot to output that leaves the technology imbedded in the production 
function unchanged. 
7 The mix of capital may change. For instance, private producers may decide to use more computers and 
fewer structures. This could raise the aggregate depreciation rate. However, we are talking about 
improvements in the efficiency that should result from the private profit motive, of every type of capital.  
8 The parameter γ is the growth rate of technological change. This parameter enters into the Euler condition, 
the modified golden rule and the steady state output equation.  
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Stabilization policy, while operating primarily on the financial side of the economic 
system via low inflation, also has real effects. Stabilization operates in our modeling through 
government budget policy. A lower level of government spending allows for higher consumption 
at each steady state, that is, if g* falls then c* rises for each y*. We emphasize here that this 
analysis refers to government spending on Warsaw Pact military activity and on inefficient state 
owned enterprises. We do not intend the model to apply to government spending on education 
and infrastructure investment. These would more properly enter the model as part of the 
development of human capital, e
ϕµ, and acquisition of physical capital k. 
Large shares of satellite states and former Soviet government budgets consisted of transfer 
payments. Balancing the budget and reducing the size of government can mean lowering 
transfers. In our model this term τ, influences the consumer budget constraint. Obviously net 
transfer recipients lose income whereas net taxpayers gain income.      
  Restructuring and deregulation, while targeted toward specific firms and industries, 
amounts to reducing government interference in private decisions to employ capital. Thus, the tax 
on capital income term, z, is the parameter through which deregulation influences the steady 
state. This z-term also reflects actual taxes on capital, so that both stabilization reform and 
deregulatory reform act on z, the implicit tax on income from capital. 
  The fifth reform, freer international trade flows, operates in several ways in the 
analysis. The Ricardian view that trade exploits comparative advantage and thus benefits both 
trading partners is central to economists’ well-known advocacy of free trade. This means that free 
trade improves the mix and quality of consumer goods, which in turn increases utility derived 
from each level of consumption. For the same reason free trade will lower economic depreciation 
by improving the mix and quality of capital goods. The endogenous growth model that allows 
technology transfer from advanced economies to emerging ones introduced the κ-term. This term 
is the parameter through with technology is transferred from advanced to emerging economies.  
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Thus, the free trade reform raises the rate of transfer of technology. This mechanism reflects 
two different effects. First, domestic producers, forced to compete on international markets, adopt 
more efficient methods. Second, foreign firms producing domestically use new technologies.  
2.  Voting behavior and the growth model 
In principal, an economic agent could compute the gains or losses that she expects to accrue 
from a reform or a package of reforms. Consider an economic and political agent (possible voter) 
who confronts the choice of voting for a reform (or reform package). If the reformer wins, the 
reforms will be installed and this will alter her economic environment. If the reformers lose, then 
reforms will not be installed. According to our growth model, the outcome of the election will 
influence her calculation of the present discounted value of her future utility stream, based on her 
optimal plan. How will she vote? 
Suppose she exploits the model in the previous section to compute her expected income and 
well-being under the reform(s) and compares this to her economic well-being in the previous 
period without the reforms. Let U*t be the utility expected from implementation of the reforms 
given information available to the economic agent at time t of the election: 
(1) U*i, t = ℑi [Ui,t : R*t, E t-1, Ci] 
where ℑ is an expectation operator contingent on the information about R t given E t-1 and C i.  R*t 
is the package of economic reforms proposed by reformers in the election at time t.  Ci is the 
relevant characteristic set of individual-i that enters in to her calculation of U*t. Utility at t-1 is 
determined from known economic conditions at that time: 
 (2)  Ui,t-1 = U[E t-1, C i] 
where Et-1 is the state of the economy prior to the election. The economic agent computes her 
utility from her knowledge of economic conditions before the election. 
Let the difference for person-i in the time-t election be 
(3) Di,,t ≡  U*i,t  – Ui,t-1.  
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Her voting decision is straightforward. Let vi,t be a variable that takes on the value 1 if she 
votes yes and 0 if she votes no. Then we have 
     1  iff   Di,t  >  0 
(4)  vi,t  = { 
         0  iff  Di,t  ≤   0 
If i = 1, 2, . . ., n, then  
(5)  Vt  ≡ i=1∑
i=n  vi,t  >  n/2    ⇒  reformers win the election.
9 
  If our model were strictly accurate and if we had certain data, we could forecast the vote 
of each person. We would need data on the pertinent characteristics of each individual voter (or 
subset of voters). We would need data on each proposed reform as well as on economic 
conditions each period before the election. With this information, we could compute Dit and 
predict how each person will vote in the election. In theory such information is available before 
each election. That is, nothing we assume to know in our calculations is unobservable in 
principle. Of course, the world is not so well behaved, our model is not strictly accurate and such 
detailed data is unavailable for transition economies. 
  Nonetheless, we focus on two econometric problems. First, we deal with the 
simultaneous and interactive nature of economic events, reforms and elections. Second, our 
model applies to people who vote according to their own immediate economic self-interest and 
assume that their votes count. There are people who do not do this. After all, some people do not 
vote. Some people vote for reasons unrelated to their own self-interest—perhaps ideology, for 
example. We develop a conceptual model for this problem in section 4. 
                                                            




3.  Simultaneous equation system 
Our model implies that the vote in an election for reformers will depend on specific factors. 
Existing economic conditions, Ei,t-1, determine Ui,t-1 in equation (3) for each individual-i. The 
proposed set of reforms, R*t will determine U*i,t, the potential future gains for voters of reforms. 
This is seen in equation (1). The characteristics of the voting population, Ci, will influence how 
each Di,t is determined and translated into an actual vote. Recalling that V represents the number 
of votes for reform parties, we have 
 (6)  Vt  = Vt[ Ci, R*t, Et -1, Yt-1 ]     ∀ i=1,…,n.  
The variable Yt-1 represents non-economic factors that influence elections. The model formalizes 
the result that the outcome of a political event, the votes in an election, depends on the proposed 
reform package and on economic conditions before the election. Thus, politics depends on 
economics as well as on the proposals by candidates during the election.  
Economic performance at time-t depends on previous elections through the rules set by the 
party in power during previous periods, Rt-1. Thus,  
 (7)  Et = Et [ Rt-1, Et-1, Hj] 
where Hj represents forces other than prior economic performance and the reform (or non-reform) 
regime of the previous election and the subscript j indexes countries. E t-1 represents inertia in the 
economic system. Hj will be used empirically to distinguish attitudes toward capitalism that have 
resulted from historical experiences or lack thereof with capitalism and with relative well-being 
under communism.  
  In addition to economics influencing voting and voting influencing economics through 
reforms, reforms undoubtedly reflect votes for reformers as well as historical experiences. This 
gives us: 
 (8)  Rt = Rt [ Vt , Hj ].  
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Equations (6) – (8) comprise a three-equation system. We think of Ci as a country-
specific dummy variable so that some countries voting may be influenced by different non-
economic factors.  Hj is a possible dummy variable for differences in historical experience before 
and during communist control.  
We linearize the system as follows: 
(9)   Et  = α01 + α31 Rt-1 + α41Et-1 + α61Hj  + εt
E   
  V t  = α02 + α22 R*t + α42Et-1 + α52Ci + εt
V 
   R t = α03 + α13 Vt   +  α 63Hj  +  ε 
R 
Since we have no independent data on expected and realized reform regimes, we represent 
them empirically by the same variable R. Therefore (expected) reforms, measured as realized 
reforms, influence votes and votes influence subsequent reforms. This creates simultaneous 
equation bias. To correct for this bias we will employ two-stage least squares methods. In model 
equation-system (9) the coefficient of V in the reform equation, α13, is overidentified.  
We ran Hausman tests for simultaneous equation bias and as will be shown later, these tests 
confirmed the bias of the ordinary least squares estimator of α13. To illustrate the theory of the 
two-stage least squares estimation procedure in this case, we rearrange terms in equation system 
(9) for matrix notation, 
 
(9’)  Et                            -  α01  -  α31Rt-1  -  α41Et-1               -  α61Hj    =  εt
E 
                  Vt  -  α22Rt  -  α02                  -  α42Et-1  -  α52Ci                 =  εt
V 




Using matrix notation, we define variables as follows: 
 
 y  ≡  [Et , Vt, R t]     Γ  ≡       1      0       0          
                     0      1    - α13      
                         0   - α22     1        
 
X   ≡   [1   R t-1   E t-1  C  H ]     
 
          - α01     -  α02   - α03                                           
B  ≡    - α31         0        0         
          - α41       - α42      0             ε  ≡ [ ε
E   ε
V  ε
R ], 
             0        - α52       0         
          - α61         0    - α63          
 
The matrix y is the matrix of endogenous variables, X is the matrix of exogenous and 
predetermined variables, and ε is the matrix of stochastic terms. The model is  
    yΓ - XB = ε. 
Solving for y we have 
   y = XBΓ
-1  + εΓ
-1. 
Finally, defining  
  Π ≡ BΓ
-1     and    µ ≡  εΓ
-1     
we have 
  (10)  y = XΠ + µ. 
Equation (10) is a system of three equations that can be used to estimate the unknown 
parameter set  Π. The structural parameters in B and Γ depend on Π. As we noted earlier the  
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coefficient for the vote variable in the reform equation, α13, is over-identified. We determine 
α13 from Π using two-stage least squares. Before turning to estimation, we consider problems 
resulting from the fact that some eligible voters choose not to vote and some who do vote do not 
base their choice on their own personal self-interest (pocketbook issues). With the right kind of 
data, this problem can be dealt with by modifying the second equation in the equation system (9). 
4. Allowing for not voting pocketbook issues 
The model above applies to individuals who vote in their own economic self-interest, i.e., 
they “vote their pocketbooks.” People may vote for reformers because they think the reforms will 
improve their long-range economic prospects. Other people vote against reformers because they 
expect reforms to result in personal losses. In either case, we modeled above the conduct only of 
agents who vote their pocketbooks. Voting behavior is of course far more complex. Many people 
do not vote their pocketbooks and some people do not vote at all. Some people vote for 
ideological, social or other reasons without regard to pocketbook issues. Furthermore, a sensible 
voting model needs to allow for two people with the same economic prospects to vote differently, 
or to allow for one person to vote while another does not.  
It would also be interesting to model the intensity of interest in political events. Some people 
devote enormous energies to electoral politics and some pay little attention. We turn now to a 
model that allows some of these distinctions in voter behavior.  
The model exploits the notion that voting takes time and that time is valuable. This allows us 
to adapt a model from labor market theory.
10 Suppose utility, W, derives from goods, G, and from 
leisure, L: 
W =W(G, L) = G
αL
β. 
Solving for the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure in the Cobb-Douglas 
case yields 
                                                            
10 This model is from Berndt (1991), pp. 617-29.  
 
13 
 MRSL,G = (β/α) G/L. 
Recall that D was the gain (or loss) expected to accrue from the election. If we let T be the 
time needed to vote, then the gain from the election is D×T. If leisure time is lost for voting, then 
the time to vote costs lost leisure. If we normalize on leisure time, then L = 1-T. If income from 
sources uninfluenced by the reform package is Θ, then G = D×T + Θ. Since different people have 
different tastes regarding goods versus leisure, we introduce a stochastic term η so that 
  W = [D×(T+η) + Θ]
α[1-(T+η)]
β. 
The marginal rate of substitution is: 
 (11)    MRSL,G = (β/α) [D×(T+η)+Θ]/[1-(T+η)]. 
Some people will not vote at all and others will vote for reasons other than their own 
economic self-interest. Consider a person for whom T=0 because, based on the economic 
implications for his own utility, he does not find it “worth his time to vote.” At what level do 
benefits from voting rise just enough to persuade this person to vote? The answer is the point at 
which benefits exactly equal the time cost of voting. We call this level of benefits the “reservation 
benefit”. (This is analogous to the concept of a reservation wage.) Letting Dr be the reservation 
benefit, we have 
Dr =  (β/α) [(D×η)+Θ]/[1-η]. 
For any give value of η, people will find it worth their time to vote their pocketbook if and 
only if D>Dr or D > (β/α) [(D×η)+Θ]/[1-η].   
Following Berndt, define ε ≡ -η; b ≡ β/(α+β) and define J ≡ (1-b) – b(Θ/D).  The following 
decision rule determines who will vote their pocketbooks and who will not: 
  (12)  T > 0  iff  ε > -J  ⇒  Vote your pocketbook.  
  (13)  T = 0  iff  ε ≤ -J  ⇒  Do not vote your pocketbook. 
For T > 0, then D = MRSL,G and we can solve for T: 
  (14)  T = (1-b) – b(Θ/D) + ε    for T > 0.  
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This model may now be used to explain the decision process by which people decide 
how to vote. The model may be interpreted in one of two ways. One approach is to assume that T 
is zero, in which case the personal economic implications of an election are not relevant to the 
potential voter. He either fails to vote or votes for reasons unrelated to reforms. If T is not zero, 
we assume the person chooses to vote. He must then decide whether to vote for or against 
reforms. Notice that the decision to vote for reformers involves two decisions. One is a decision 
to vote and the second is a decision to vote yes or no on the reform proposal (or candidate).  
Suppose we consider data only on voters. We are implicitly ignoring the first stage of the 
decision and censoring our sample. One implication of the model is that the variables that 
determine how one would vote are the same variables that determine whether or not to vote. This 
means that if we fail to allow for non-voters, then the disturbance term in our voting equation will 
be correlated with the variables in the voting equation, causing biased estimators. To generate 
unbiased estimators of an equation explaining votes, we need to account for nonvoters. To do 
this, we recognize that the decision to vote yes on reform is determined by a system of equations, 
equations (13), if T=0, and equations (12) and (14) if T≠0. With data on Θ, D, and T one can 
build an econometric model based on (12) – (14). 
A second interpretation of the above model is that it explains the amount of time one spends 
in voting one’s pocketbook. That is, it could explain variations in the value of T when T>0. 
Equation (14) comes into play when T>0. This equation explains how much time a person will 
spend on voting. It depends on α, β, Θ, and D and ε.  Put another way, this model tells us how 
much effort one may put into electoral politics. The amount of time depends on specific variables 
described next.  
The coefficients α and β represent the elasticity of substitution between tastes for goods and 
for leisure. The term Θ is income unrelated to the election. If the person owns considerable 
resources unrelated to the election then she is less likely to vote. However, given Θ if D is large,  
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then much is at stake in the election and she is likely to spend more time in electoral politics. 
Perhaps this helps to explain why some elections bring out many union voters or special-interest 
voters or senior citizens. In our context, it helps to explain why employees of state owned 
enterprises may be politically very active and why young, low-income voters with long-range 
prospects may be very active. Older people who feel their pensions are threatened are also likely 
to vote their pocket books and spend some time involved in the political process. 
The model has another nice feature. The term ε can be thought of as the person’s “taste for 
voting.” This means two people with the same Θ and D, the same nonpolitical sources of income 
and same stakes, may behave differently. One may vote and devote energies to politics and one 
may not.  
  We turn now to estimation considerations of this model. Let εi be person i’s taste for 
voting. This could be his ideological belief in voting or his enjoyment of the process. Let Ji be the 
value of J given (α,β), Θi and Di. We assume a normal distribution for ε and a variance of σ:
  ε i ~ N(0,σ ). 
It follows that ε i /σ  ~ N(0,1). Thus the probability that person-i votes is 
  P(i votes)  =  P[(εi > J i  ⇔  (εi /σi)>(J i /σi)] 
                              
      =  z=-Ji/σ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
z=∞ f(z) dz = 1 – F( -J i /σ) 
w h e r e       













         z = ∞  
 F(  -J i /σ  ) =    ∫ f(z)  dz. 
    z =   - J  i /σ  
The likelihood function is 
  L =  i∈Ω∏ [1 – F(.)]  i∉Ω∏  F(.), 
where Ω is the set of voters. Maximizing the log of the likelihood function with respect to γ1, γ2 
and σ yields three normal equations from which we can estimate the three unknowns γ1, γ2 and σ. 
Empirical implementation of this model requires information on the unknown parameter set α, β, 
Θ, and D for specific individual voters (or groups of voters.) We do not have such data for 
transition economies. We next employ the data that we do have for six transition economies. 
5. Econometric results and the data 
In the econometrics we focus on three questions drawn from theory. First, does it make sense 
for us to talk about reformers vs. non-reformers? In some countries such a distinction may seem 
inappropriate. Unless reformers can be distinguished from non-reformers, then we have no way 
of assessing the relationship between politics, reform and economic outcomes. If everyone is an 
equivalent reformer, then the voters’ choices are not relevant to whether or not reforms occur. We 
thus explore this question before we look at the interactions between election outcomes, reform 
policies, and economic performance. We believe that in most countries some political parties are 
more inclined toward strong reform policies than other parties. In Europe, liberals are typically 
strong advocates of market-based reforms and socialists may resist such reforms.
11 In some 
countries, however, such distinctions are blurred. 
The second question (contingent on answers to the first) deals with votes for reformers. 
Under what economic conditions and with what reform proposals do reformers get elected? We 
                                                            
11 In Central Europe capitalism is clearly not the only option.  
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consider several measures of economic performance, several indicators of reform, and 
several measures of election outcomes. Third, how have transition economies performed during 
and after political regimes strongly inclined toward reform and away from socialism? Even 
partial answers to this last question may indicate problems that reform supporters will have to 
confront in moving economies toward markets. 
The data used in the regression analysis had to be converted from the detailed election 
outcome results and reform indicators.
12 Economic data was converted from an annual basis to an 
election interval basis for some tests. First, we report on constructed reform indexes for each 
country and each year. Table 1 contains reform indexes that we constructed, when possible, for 
each country in each year from 1989 to 1999. Each country’s reform index in Table 1 is compiled 
from annual indexes for each of the five reform areas, when adequate data is available. Thus, 
these indexes represent reform progress in each country, across all reform areas, with a common 
base, 1995 = 100.  We first constructed sub-indexes for price liberalization, property 
privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, and restructuring and 
deregulation. The country annual index number is an average of the five sub-indexes. Where 
feasible, each sub-index received the same weight. 
                          Table 1:  Reform progress indexes by country  1989-1999 
Year Bulgaria Czech 
Rep. 
Estonia Hungary Russia Slovakia 
1989    76.9    94.0   131.6  102.3  110.9    ---- 
1990    84.9  106.8    112.3  128.9  116.6    ---- 
1991    96.0  101.7   119.3  109.7  109.6    ---- 
1992  108.9      96.5   129.1  115.0  141.1    ---- 
1993  105.5    96.0     97.4  105.4  134.2    91.9 
1994    98.1  102.5   111.0    81.0  108.9  105.0 
1995 100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1996    96.0    87.2    104.8  115.5  106.9    98.2 
1997  119.0    84.9   101.6  122.8  141.4    82.0 
1998  121.6   100.4   106.0  117.5  114.6  114.8 
1999    ----    ----     96.0    ----  123.3    86.5 
                                                            
12 Reform events are summarized in Table 14. Details on political and economic data come from Dillon and 
Wykoff (forthcoming). Economic data come primarily from well-known international agency sources, the 
IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Country Studies of the 




  We illustrate the procedure in Table 2 that has the five sub-indexes for Bulgaria. The 
underlying data for the sub-indexes comes from reform data. Data for each reform policy was 
quite different so that each index in Table 2 had to be compiled in a different manner. In the cases 
of price liberalization and property privatization, we had only general and occasional pieces of 
information. We know when key laws or agencies were created and when the reform process was 
announced and initiated. We also have occasional information on the percentages of prices 
liberalized or of certain types of property privatized. One cannot always be certain of the quality 
of government data. The data on restructuring and deregulation consists of binomial data 
signifying only when major changes were made in the organization of the finance sector, 
bankruptcy laws, wage controls, major international trade agreements, fiscal reforms and so forth. 
These are intended to reflect the disentanglement of the government from normal private market 
activity. Price liberalization, property privatization and restructuring indexes are thus rough 
indicators of reform progress built from non-cardinal data sources. 
                                      Table 2:  Reform sub-indexes for Bulgaria  1989-1998 
                                                                             1995=100 
Year  Prices Privatize Stabilize Trade Restructure General 
1989    57.5    79.0    77.0    71.0  100.0    76.9 
1990    57.5    79.0    85.0    84.0  118.7    84.9 
1991  125.4    81.5    76.0    78.2  118.7    96.0 
1992  125.4    99.3    98.0  102.9  118.7  108.9 
1993  125.4  101.9    84.0    97.5  118.7  105.5 
1994  100.0  104.5    93.0    92.8  100.0    98.1  
1995  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 
1996  100.0    98.6    76.0  105.2  100.0    96.0 
1997  100.0  130.5    88.0  128.0  148.7  119.0 
1998  100.0 130.5  121.0  107.8 148.7  121.6 
 
  The reform indexes for stabilization and trade policies contain some data that are more 
traditional and typically cardinal. In the case of stabilization, we have data on budget deficits by 
year and on changes in exchange rates per year. We have some data on money growth. Each of  
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these sources contributed to our stabilization index. In the case of the trade liberalization 
index, we used data on foreign debt and imports as percentages of GDP. We used balance on 
current account figures and the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP.  
  To form indexes of each area of reform, we had to find a way to integrate information 
from disparate sources. We wanted to compute averages from each data source in order to use all 
the data and minimize the importance of any individual source of error. The relative importance 
of each element of an average depends on its variance. Thus, we wanted to deal with the problem 
that one source of data with a large variance could dominate and distort the average. This is 
undesirable, because one source may contain errors and because while progress may have been 
unusually good or bad for any one indicator, reform overall might have been different. To achieve 
our goal from the “raw data,” we compiled the Table 2 sub-indexes as follows. For each data 
source, say the budget deficit, we took the observations over the period and converted them into a 
variable that centered on 100 with a variance of 25. This resulted in giving each data source the 
same influence on variance. We normalized each series by setting 1995 to 100, and then averaged 
the several raw data series for that reform area to obtain the sub-index for that reform. 
  Table 3 contains the values per election interval of the country-specific reform indexes. It 
also contains the percentage of votes for reform parties in each election, derived from the election 
outcomes and on our best judgment regarding reform and non-reform parties and coalitions. The 
first column contains a binomial 0-1 variable for whether pro-reform parties were elected or not. 
Column 2 is the percentage of the vote for reformers in each election. There were a total of 
twenty-five national elections in the six countries from 1989 to 1999. We determined these 
percentages from the figures reported both for elections and for parliamentary seats actually 
acquired. We had to delete three elections due to data limitations on some variables. The reform 




Reform indexes are calculated for the relevant election intervals on an annualized basis. 
That is, reform variables are weighted averages of the annual data. The weights reflect the 
number of months of each year during the election interval. In other words, if an election occurs 
in May, the fifth month of the year, then seven months of that year are attributed to the new 
regime. We do not have monthly data, so we assign a weight of 7/12 to that year’s reform index. 
                   Table 3:  Elections regimes and a reform index by country 
                                                          1989 – 1999 
                                                    **** Bulgaria**** 
Month/Year   Regime 1⇒ 
reform  
% vote-reformers  Reform index  
  6/1990          0        43.0%              91.0 
  1/1992        1        49.5      104.0 
  1/1995        0        45.4               98.0 
  4/1997        1        59.7      120.6 
 
                                               ****Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia  until 1993)**** 
   6/1990        1        51.5%     101.7 
   6/1992        1        36.7        96.4 
 12/1996        0        33.3       90.1 
   6/1998        1        49.0     100.4  
 
                                               ****Estonia**** 
     5/1990        1         61%      120.0 
     9/1992        1         54.7                107.2 
     3/1995        0         46.1        102.5  
     3/1997        0         39.0      103.3 
     3/1999        1         76.7       (96.0) 
 
                                              ****Hungary**** 
     4/1990        1         42.7%          110.2 
     5/1994        0         27.7          108.5 
     5/1998        1         52.5           117.5    
 
                                               ****Russia (Duma)**** 
     3/1989 (Yeltsin)        1        (89.4%)                 113.1 
     6/1991-Pres.        1         57.3           132.4 
   12/1993-Duma        0         27.9                  104.5 
   12/1995-Duma        0         24.2           106.9 
     7/1996-Pres.        1         57.4            124.1 
    12/1999-Duma        1         56.1           123.3 
 
                                          ****Slovak Republic**** 
     12/1992        0          48.0%             98.5     
       3/1994        1            
     12/1994        0          45.2             97.7    





Table 4 combines the voting and reform data from Table 3 with corresponding 
economic variables, after deleting unusable observations. We actually used two sets of economic 
data. We used the percentage changes in GDP, the inflation rates and the unemployment rates for 
the specific year after the election and the year before the election. Like the reform index, 
economic variables were calculated for election intervals. These figures are in Table 4. All 
regressions were run using both annual economic data and election-interval economic data.  
 
                                     Table 4: Elections, reforms, and economic performance 







   GDP % change         Inflation rate 
           
Unemployment rate 
       %  1995=100  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
                                                                            Bulgaria   
1990    43.0      91.0    - 10.8     -  4.3    233.6      14.1      8.0      0.8 
1992    49.5    104.0    -   2.3    - 10.8      86.7    233.6    14.8      8.0 
1995    45.4      98.0    -   4.8    -   2.3    233.9      86.7    12.1    14.8 
1997    59.7    120.6    -   0.5    -   4.8      11.3    233.9    14.0    12.1 
                                                                       Czech Republic  
1990    51.5    101.7    -  9.0      2.6      33.5        4.2      2.9      0.5 
1992    36.7      96.4       1.6   -  9.0      12.1      33.5      3.2      2.9 
1996    33.3      90.1    -  0.2      1.6        9.1      12.1      5.0      3.2 
1998    49.0    100.4    -  1.3   -  0.2        5.0        9.1      8.8      5.0 
                                                                              Estonia  
1990    61.0    120.1    - 11.4       3.8    466.2        3.8      1.2      0.3 
1992    54.7    107.2    -   5.0  - 11.4    165.5    466.2      7.4      1.2 
1995    46.1    102.5         4.9  -   5.0      23.8     165.5      9.9      7.4 
1997    39.0    103.3        6.4      4.9        8.7       23.8      9.8      9.9 
                                                                             Hungary  
1990    42.7    110.2    -   4.1   -    0.4      26.4        3.5      9.9      0.8 
1994    27.7    108.5        2.8   -    4.1      21.8      26.4    10.7      9.9 
1998    52.5    117.5        4.4        2.8      11.6      21.8      9.4    10.7 
                                                                               Russia  
1991    57.3    132.4    -  10.3    -    2.2    978.3      18.0    4.1    3.5 
1993    27.9    104.5    -    8.4    -  10.3    459.5    978.3    7.7    4.1 
1995    24.2    106.9    -    3.5    -    8.4      47.6    459.5    9.2    7.7 
1996    57.4    124.1    -    1.0    -    3.5      43.0      47.6  11.3    9.3 
1999    56.1    123.3         1.7    -    1.0      85.7      43.0  12.0  11.3 
                                                                        Slovak Republic  
1992    48.0       98.5    -    4.5    -    5.6      18.3    22.6    6.2  11.1 
1994    45.2      97.7         6.3    -    4.5        7.0    18.3    10.0    6.2 
 
6. Votes, reforms and performance:  dummy variable models 
Before we can begin to analyze the relationships between economics and politics, we first 
need to establish whether votes for parties that we refer to as “reformers” actually lead to reforms.  
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Thus, our first set of results concern the influence votes for reformers have on subsequent 
reforms.  
Binomial dummy variables   
The econometric analysis begins with a simple model using binomial dummy variables to 
represent votes for reformers or socialists and dummy variables for reforms. These data are 
constructed as follows. First, all the countries and elections are pooled, though specific country 
dummy variables are used to explore certain country-specific hypotheses. Each election is treated 
as a discrete event in which the winners can be identified as either pro-reform or antireform. 
Dummy variables identify the outcome. The variable Vote is 1 when a reform government won 
an election, and Vote is 0 when reformers lost. The socialist (non-reform oriented) variable, 
Votsoc, is simply 1 when socialists win and 0 otherwise. As noted above, in many cases, the 
interpretation of pro-reform vs. antireform is open to argument. In Hungary, for instance, many 
communists lay claim to favoring reforms. As we explain in the earlier, we regard these claims as 
problematic. While changes in how business is undertaken had to occur and new legislation had 
to be proposed and passed, this is not the same as reform aimed at establishing a viable climate 
for private markets. The types of reforms needed to make capitalist economies work are not likely 
to be endorsed by communists, whether reform minded or not.   
The dummy variable Reform indicates whether an actual major reform period occurred or 
not. This simplification of real-world events assigns a distinctly noncontinuous variable to a 
qualitative set of activities. The dummy variable Reform is set to 1 when significant economic 
reforms were installed (the reform index exceeds the average for the country) and 0 when not. 
There are two incumbency dummy variables: One for incumbent, for an election in which voters 
retain the (dominant) incumbent parties, and one for elections in which reform incumbents are 
retained. The continuous economic performance variables include the rate of real GDP growth, 
the rate of inflation in the consumer price index and the unemployment rate. We also add the 
inflation and unemployment rates to create a misery index.  
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                                   Table 5: Dummy regression results on reforms 
Reform = R[ Votes, Economics, Country]
                                          Reform dummy – Dependent variable  
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                                                                   Equation statistics  
    R
2  .7804 .8190 .6791 .6783 .7642 .6120 .6381 
    DF      16      15      16      14      15      18      17 
F-statistic  11.3739  11.3141   6.7723    4.2176   8.1012   9.4625   7.4947 
   R-bar
2  .5946 .5850 .5172 .4522 .5458 .5245 .5166 
     N      22      22      22     22      22      22      22 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses beneath coefficients. L: variable lagged one period.  
R: Incumbent reformers only.  
 
Why reform? 
Votes for reformers are consistently correlated with subsequent reforms. The coefficients 
indicating the effect on reform of votes for reformers (the variable Vote) are positive in every 
reform equation in Table 5. All vote coefficients are significantly different from zero – we can 
reject the null hypothesis that voting for reformers has no effect on reforms taking place.  The 
coefficient of the lagged reform variable is negative and significant in two of four equations. This 
result indicates that reforms can lead to the ouster of reformers. This observation would be 
consistent with our view that reforms are going to be unpopular in the short run, so that 
undertaking reforms is a risky political business. Reform progress toward capitalist markets in 
former socialist states is likely to be a stop-go process, since unpopular reform results in removal  
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of reform parties. Socialists then replace reformers until a new economic crisis induces 
reelection of reformers.    
The only country variable that was significant in the reform dummy equations was the 
Slovakian dummy that was positive, which suggests that reform occurred in Slovakia even though 
reformers were not elected.  
It seems evident from the raw data that the reformers enter office during extremely poor 
economic conditions, usually depression or hyperinflation or both. While this point may seem 
obvious, socialists are unlikely to relinquish power unless forced to by crisis. Perhaps more 
importantly, official statistics of economic conditions, while probably flawed, imply that 
economic conditions deteriorate more after reformers are in office. These facts have important 
implications for the political dimensions to economic reform. Every reform regime has to make a 
case for people tolerating hard times before reforms are going to bring about a turn of events. 
This is a major problem for economic reforms in any democracy. How does one get the electorate 
to accept the down time before reforms can kick in? It is especially difficult in former communist 
regimes in which promises of a better future were a well-worn mantra. 
Indeed, positive economic performance slightly favors socialists. Voters may risk the 
security of the welfare state and the siren song of socialism unless under severe economic 
distress. The hard reforms needed to achieve Western-style market economies are unlikely to be 
popular. Incumbency, as in the West, tends to help both parties. It strongly favors the socialists, 
who apparently have to mess the economy up pretty badly to be unseated.  Reformers have had a 
more difficult time sustaining power. This may reflect the fact that economic performance is poor 
under their leadership. Unfortunately for reformers, successful economic performance can lag 
significantly behind political actions that set the stage for such performance. This creates a 





Should they vote for reformers? 
The next set of dummy variable regressions, Table 6, attempts to explain voting behavior as 
a function of reforms, economic forces and country dummy variables. While reforms mildly tend 
to support better economic performance, the presence of reform governments indicates poorer 
economic performance. This latter effect probably reflects the poor conditions inherited by 
reformers and their inability in many instances, especially in Bulgaria, Russia and Hungary, to 
obtain decisive majorities that would have allowed them to institute robust and meaningful 
reforms.  
                                   Table 6: Dummy regression results on vote variables 
                                                  Vote = R[ Reform, Economics, Country] 
                                    Dependent variable  
             Vote for reformers     Reform incumbent      Vote for socialists  
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                                                                    Equation statistics  
   R
2  .5127  .4590 .2799 .5713 .5362 .4789 .3945 
   DF      18    19      18      17      19      17      17 
F-statistic   6.3120  8.0606   2.3317   5.6627  10.9834   3.8998   2.7689 
   R-bar
2  .4394  .4153 .2399 .4624 .4851 .3874 .3193 
     N      22      22      22     22      22      22      22 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses beneath coefficients. L variable lagged one period. 
R: Incumbent reformers only. 
Measured economic performance 
Table 7 contains regressions to explain economic variables with lagged economic variables 
and other economic variables as well as dummy variables for votes and for reforms. The first four 
equations are attempts to explain income. The lagged reforms variable tends to be negatively 
correlated with income. This result suggests that reforms do not quickly lead to increases in  
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growth rates. Income has some trend in it, judging from the positive coefficient on lagged 
income. Inflation lagged has a negative effect on income growth. This is certainly consistent with 
traditional analysis of inflation’s negative effects on market performance. Lagged government 
budget deficits have persistent negative effects on income growth, again a result consistent with 
our expectations. 
  The inflation variable seems to us to be one of the more reliable economic indicators.  In 
Table 7, columns 5 to 7 are attempts to explain this economic variable. Inflation follows lagged 
inflation and corresponds to lower income and lower unemployment. Government budget 
deficits, lagged, raise the inflation rate. The negative significant coefficient on the Bulgarian 
variable implies, ceteris paribus, lower inflation than elsewhere. We now turn to more precise 
measures of voting behavior and reform regimes. 
                           Table 7 Economic variables on dummy variables for reform and votes 
                               Economics = D[ Vote, Reform, Economics, Country] 
                                             Dependent variable  
                                             Income                   - - - - Inflation - - - - 
                 Per year      Per election interval   
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                                                                    Equation statistics  
    R
2  .5860 .6722 .4927 .4876 .7632 .7282 .7603 
    DF      16      14      16      15      15      15      15 
F-statistic    4.5298   4.1021   3.1081   2.3795   8.0555    6.6981   7.9311 
   R-bar
2  .4465 .4482 .3754 .3483 .5451 .5201   .5431 
     N      22      22      22      22      22      22      22 




7. Votes, reform and performance:  percentage of votes and reform indexes 
Does the percentage of votes cast for reform parties (as we identify them) lead to more 
reform in the subsequent election interval? We ask a corollary question. Are any countries 
different in terms of the influence of elections on reforms? Some observers have claimed that 
“everyone is a reformer.” This is most certainly not true in some countries. Bulgaria, for instance, 
has two sets of parties or coalitions that have distinct differences of opinion regarding markets. 
Socialist and agrarian parties have tended to resist reforms, whereas the UDF has been very 
strongly pro-reform. The socialists have also proven unwilling to correct fiscal imbalances and 
have been slow to accept central bank independence. The relative power of the communists in the 
Russian Duma also seemed to have an important impact on Yeltsin’s willingness and ability to 
adopt strong reforms.  
However, in some countries identifying reformers is much more problematic. In countries 
like Estonia and Hungary the issue is much less obvious and differences are blurred. Still, we 
tried to distinguish parties likely to have stronger pro-market orientation from those who may 
resist the more difficult pro-market policies. In Hungary, for instance, the socialist parties have a 
lot of former communists who may feel lukewarm about privatization, stock markets and 
restructuring. In Czechoslovakia the Velvet Divorce reflected strong differences of opinion 
between the Czech leader Mr. Klaus and the Slovak leader Mr. Merciar.  The former was, at least 
in the early years, a staunch pro-market advocate, whereas the latter held to the old ways. Later in 
the Czech Republic, under a weakened ODS led by Mr. Klaus, reform stalled. In fact, the 
opposition parties ran against the ODS on the ground that more restructuring was needed. Indeed, 
it became evident that the highly visible voucher privatization had in fact led to less “private” and 
more “government” influence than had been advertised. The central bank retained significant 
influence through ownership of financial assets of many companies, especially in the financial 
sector; and the government controlled banks that in turn controlled investment funds that held 
most vouchers.  
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Many local analysts felt the slump in the Czech economy in the late 1990s reflected the 
failure of the Czech government to adopt stronger restructuring efforts. Not only was central 
control of the financial sector sustained, but also many state owned enterprises with large 
numbers of workers stayed on the government payroll. It was these delays and the position of Mr. 
Klaus’s opposition that caused us to identify him as a “relative non-reformer” and them as 
“relatively pro-reform” prior to the 1996 and 1998 elections. 
Estonia is an interesting case, because everyone purports to favor reforms. This is as we had 
expected, given the antagonism toward external domination and the subsuming of all Estonia into 
the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union. Estonians are to be in a hurry to return to the 
western fold. Still, even here the socialist ways are hard to give up and the pace of reforms has 
not been even over election cycles.  
Country-specific analysis 
Table 8 reports country-specific regressions of the following equation: 
Reform = α + β Vote + ε, where α and β are the unknown intercept and slope coefficients to be 
estimated and ε is the unknown disturbance term. For most countries we have few observations 
because they have not held many national elections. These regressions do indicate the degree of 
correlation between votes for reformers and subsequent reforms. 
                                                      Table 8: Country-specific and pooled regressions on reform* 
                                                              Reform = α + β Vote + ε                                      
                                                      Country equations       Pooled data 
Variable Bulgaria Czech  Rep.  Estonia  Hungary Russia   














Vote    1.7060 
(14.4502 
   .4952 
(3.5187) 
   .7207 
(2.3679) 
   .3421 
(1.9874) 








       16.6763 
(7.4078) 
 
                                                                                Equation statistics 
   R
2  .9905 .8755 .7371 .7986 .8984 .3178  .8245 
   DF      2      2      2      1      3      20      19 
F-statistic  208.809   14.0637    5.6071    3.9661    26.5406   9.3187  44.6218 
  R-bar
2  .6603 .5837 .4914 .3993 .6738 .3027  .7459 
    N      4      4      4      3      5     22     22 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficients.   




  The slope coefficients in the country-specific regressions are positive and range from .34 
for Hungary to 1.86 for Bulgaria. Evidently votes for reformers as we measure them are 
correlated with the index for reform as we measure it. We have few events, so statistics do not tell 
us much, but these results fail to rule out a connection between votes for reformers and 
subsequent reforms. The last two regression columns in Table 8 are pooled data for all six 
countries. The last regression includes a dummy variable equal to 1 for Russia and Hungary. This 
variable, History, represents the idea that strong local support for communist philosophy is 
retained in these two countries. We elaborate on this idea below. 
Analyzing reform with pooled data  
To look in more detail at whether one can distinguish reformers from non-reformers, we ran 
a number of regressions on pooled data. Table 9 contains reports on eight regressions. The reform 
index for each election interval, the dependent variable, depends on the percentage of votes 
garnished by reformers, on an economic variable (or set of variables) and on a history variable. 
The history variable is a dummy variable—1 for countries (Russia and Hungary) that had strong 
homegrown communist parties and relative success while under communist control. Of course, 
considerable additional experimentation was done and Table 9 is illustrative. We tested for 
history before communism—Estonia, the Czechs and Hungary all had golden eras of success in 
recent periods prior to the ascent of communism. We tested another history under communism 
variable; some countries had relatively good relations with communists (Bulgaria and Slovakia). 
Only the history under communism representing the strong version of well-being under 
communism mattered. We can reject the null hypothesis that history under communism does not 






                                                Table 9: Do votes for reformers result in reforms?  
                                                        Reform = R[Vote, Economics, History ]* 
Variable                                  linear forms              natural log-linear forms  
         
Constant    67.212 
(13.23)* 
   68.405 
  (13.57) 
  65.417 
(11.677) 
  68.81 
(14.34) 
   3.20 
 (20.79) 
  3.62 
(20.20) 
  3.52 
(18.91) 
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(19.12) 
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(6.94) 










Misery    
  

















    .4238 
 (1.73) 
    
Inflation    
  
       .0137 
 (2.22) 





  16.68  
(7.41) 
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                                                                                     Equation statistics 
    R
2      .8245      .8411  .8305 .8647 .7672 .7680 .7869 .7888 
    DF          19      18    18    17    19    18    18    18 
 F-statistic   44.62    31.77   29.39  27.16  31.31  19.86  22.16  22.41 
  R-bar 
2      .7459      .7210  .7118 .7000 .6942 .6583 .6745 .6761 
Best   Russ – 93  Bulg – 92    Bulg – 92  Esto – 92   Russ – 93  Bulg – 92   Esto – 95   Esto – 95  
Worst   Bulg – 97  Bulg – 97  Bulg – 97  Bulg – 97   Bulg – 97   Bulg – 97  Esto – 90   Esto – 97  
* The t-statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficients. All variables cover election intervals. 
L ≡ lagged one period. We included 22 elections, so n = 22. 
Best ≡ observation with the smallest error term. Worst ≡ largest error. 
 
The effect on reform actions, given voting behavior, is clearly different for Russia and 
Hungary than for other countries in the sample. (Equations with the one history variable 
outperformed two separate dummies, one for Russia and one for Hungary) It appears that 
reformers are even more sensitive to voters in Russia and Hungary. These two countries still have 
politically strong communist influences. The Russian communist party control of the Duma is 
historic. The socialist parties populated by many former communists continue to dominate 
Hungarian politics. These countries also seem to be ambivalent about adopting reforms. We 
expected this. Both Hungary and Russia had relatively good relations with the communist 
leadership. Russia was the seat of power for the entire Soviet Union, the satellite countries and 
with the exception of Lenin’s train ride from Germany communism was homegrown. Despite the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians are conflicted about abandoning the old ways.  This 
evidently has made reformers quite sensitive to votes for members of the Duma. Yeltsin was  
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criticized for not stabilizing the economy and legal system, but he may have had little choice 
given the post-Soviet power of Russian communists. 
Many in Hungary harbor affection for communism for a different reason. After the 
Hungarian revolt in 1957, even though Russian tanks destroyed the resistance, Hungary 
eventually was allowed a good deal of independence. As long as Hungarians maintained outward 
support for socialism and participated fully in the Warsaw Pact, they were allowed to develop 
small-scale markets. Hungary was referred to as “the happiest barracks in the camp” precisely 
because their economy was the strongest in Central Europe. This relative success of socialism 
blended with small-scale market economics and the authority of local communists gave 
Hungarians less reason to despise communist rule. Hungarians felt less eager to overthrow the old 
regime.  
It is evident from Table 9 that votes for reformers are positive and statistically significant. 
We reject the null hypothesis that votes for reformers do not lead to reforms. Put another way, our 
reform index is positively correlated with the percentage of votes for reform parties. This result 
holds up in both linear and log-linear forms and regardless of the economic variables included in 
the equation. The vote variable was also positive and significant in similar equations (explaining 
reform) using annual economic data rather than economic data per election interval. We also 
experimented with dropping observations where we felt the data might be less reliable. We 
deleted the first election in every country to see if poor early data had a significant impact on 
results. They did not. 
What explains votes for reformers? 
Suppose through campaigns that voters know what to expect from the more reform-oriented 
parties. Will these reforms and contemporary or lagged economic variables lead to votes for 
reformers?  Does history under communism make a difference—do some countries’ voters act 
differently? Table 10 contains results of eight regressions intended to shed light on these 
questions. Regressions in Table 10 explain about 65 to 75 percent of the variation in votes for  
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reformers. Reforms are invariably a significant variable and values are positive. A 10 
percent increase in a reform index is associated with a 10 percent increase in votes for reformers.  
Economic variables do not seem to have substantial effects on votes. Economic variables 
were rarely significant. We tested the percent change in GDP, the inflation rate, the 
unemployment rate, and a misery index (inflation plus unemployment). Lagged values of all 
economic variables were also examined. 
While insignificant, the economic variables tended to work against reformers. These 
empirical results may reflect several factors. One is that some of the data, especially 
unemployment and GDP figures for early years, are suspect. Second, all of the countries in our 
sample went through deep slumps with double digit declines in income. These occurred early in 
the period, right after the country swept away the communist government. Changes in the way of 
doing business had to change in all countries since the trading regime had collapsed. This first 
government after communism also had the first opportunity to institute reforms. Thus, just as the 
economies and in fact the entire social structures were collapsing around them, reformers tried to 
institute new reforms; price liberalization and property privatization initiatives were common. 
These initiatives contributed to our index of reforms. Thus, reforms are correlated in early years 
with the collapsed economies. 
Regardless of how one stands on the issue of shock therapy or on the quality of the data, one 
must accept the reality that reform is correlated, at least early on, with poor economic outcomes. 
As we have noted, this correlation is part of the reason reforms are difficult to adopt. Benefits 
accrue only after a long lag. Furthermore, the intent of reforms is to set the stage for long-run 
economic growth, not for instant gratification. The fact that the economic variables are not 
significantly and negatively correlated with votes for reformers is itself an indicator that people 
have been willing to give reform a chance.  
 




                                  Table 10: Why do people vote for reformers?  
                                         Vote = V[ Reform, Economics, History]* 
Variable                                  linear forms              natural log-linear forms   
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                                                                                    Equation statistics 
    R
2  .7384 .7421 .7664 .7663 .6607 .6623 .7098 .7119 
    Df         19    18    18    17    19    18    18    18 
  F-statistic  26.81 17.26 19.68 13.93   18.50      11.77  14.68 14.83 
  R-bar 
2  .6680 .6361 .6569 .6203 .5977 .5677 .6084 .6102 
Best   Bulg – 92  Russ – 91   Esto – 95   Esto – 95  Russ – 91  Bulg – 92   Czec – 90  Czec – 90  
Worst   Russ – 95   Russ – 95   Hung – 94  Esto – 97   Russ – 95   Russ – 95   Russ - 95  Hung – 94  
*The t-statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficients. All variables cover election intervals. 
L ≡ lagged one period. 22 elections, so n = 22. Best ≡ observation with smallest error term. 
 
The dummy variable for relatively positive performance under communism, the history 
variable, has a negative and significant coefficient. Voters in Russia and Hungary, two countries 
with strong domestic communist parties, relatively happy under communism, are less likely to 
respond positively to reforms than are voters in the other four sample countries.   
Can economic performance variables be explained?  
Table 11 contains results of six equations intended to explain variations in two economic 
variables, inflation and income. Economic data seem to be much poorer than the voting data. 
Measured GDP leaves out work at home and on small farms, which blossomed during the early 
stages of transition and in some countries it may have been difficult to capture growth in small 
retail firms. Failing large-scale former government enterprises cause severe decline in measured 
output, but this may exaggerate the decline in real underlying income since some gray market and 
extra-market activity began to take place in these plants and factories during early phases of  
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transition. Also, loss of production from some state owned enterprises may have involved 
loss of product that was unwanted in the first place. 
                                                  Table 11: Can economic performance be explained? 
                                                       Economics = E[ Reform, Vote, Economicst-1, History] 
            Inflation – dependent variable             Income – dependent variable  
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                                                               Equation statistics 
     R
2 .4992 .5002 .5767 .5283 .5005 .4778 
    DF    18    18    17    17    18    19 
F-statistic  5.980 6.005 5.789 4.760 6.012 8.691 
   R-bar
2  .4279 .4288 .4668 .4277 .4290 .4323 
Best  Hung – 98  Hung – 98  Russ – 93  Czec – 98  Russ – 96   Hung – 94 
Worst  Esto – 92   Esto – 92  Esto – 92  Slov – 94  Esto – 97   Esto – 97  
* The t-statistics are beneath coefficients. All variables cover election intervals.  
L ≡ lagged variable. 22 elections, so n = 22. Best ≡ observation with smallest error term. 
  
We focus on two issues raised in our theory work. Are reforms related positively to 
economic performance? If not, then the political work by reform-oriented political parties is more 
difficult. Unless growth follows reforms pretty quickly people may tire of promises. After all, the 
communists always promised a better tomorrow. A task of political leaders to educate the public 
about the benefits of new programs that will improve welfare, even if there are short-run costs. 
This task is hard if reforms deliver benefits only after a lengthy delay.   
Second, do differences in historical experiences among countries play a role in economic 
performance? We had two historical hypotheses. One, the existence of a golden era, in which 
capitalism and democracy were successful before the communist period, gives a practical “goal” 
for reform to achieve. This suggests that countries like Estonia, Czech Republic and Hungary 
should fare better than Russia, Slovakia and Bulgaria. The latter three countries have almost no  
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experience with democracy or successful capitalist industrialization. Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary were relatively well off and westernized before the advent of communism. 
The second historical hypothesis is that the experience under communism will influence the 
pace of adopting reforms. Relatively good times under communism could make it more difficult 
to repudiate communism. It is easier to discredit communist ways if they were imposed from 
outside and if your people were maltreated. Russia and Hungary came to be governed by willing 
local leaders. Despite, or some say because of, the 1954 Hungarian revolt, local communists were 
given a good deal of freedom in adopting a mixed economy. The Soviets gave Hungarians some 
control over their economic fortunes as long as they remained loyal to socialism. Communism, 
while unpopular with many Russians, was largely a homegrown product. Repudiating 
communism’s ways is harder when they resulted from decisions made by Russians. The 
Estonians and Czechs disliked the Soviet imposition of communism. The Slovakians and 
Bulgarians were better off in some respects under communism, and never really had a golden era 
of industrialization under capitalism and democracy. Thus, history under communism should 
influence the adoption of reforms, votes for reform parties, and economic performance. 
We attempt to explain variations in two economic outcome variables, income and inflation. 
Income, measured as the growth rate of GDP, is closest to the growth variable our theoretical 
work focuses on, but the quality of data is suspect. Inflation may be a more reliable statistic, at 
least for most countries after the fall of communism. Even this statistic is subject to serous 
criticism related to inadequate correction for quality improvements. Early price liberalization 
resulted in nominal price increases that indicated an increase in inflation. However this index 
increase merely reflected adoption of a market price system, a very different process from 
inflation. Nonetheless, these are the data available. We report six equations in Table 11. Inflation 
is the dependent variable in equations of columns 1 to 3 and income (measured as the percentage 
rate of change in real GDP) is the dependent variable in equations of columns 4 to 6.     
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The explanatory power of the economic variable equations is lower than that of reform 
and vote equations. The R-bar
2 (coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom) 
range from 42 to 45. The R
2 values are around .5, so that almost half the variation in economic 
variables can be explained by the equations.  Inflation is positively correlated with the reform 
index. This may suggest that reformers liberalized prices. Lagged inflation influences inflation, 
suggesting inertia. The history variable (1 for Russia and Hungary and 0 for the other countries) 
is negative and significant. Evidently, inflation is worse for countries that performed relatively 
well or had homegrown communist leadership.  
Variations in the growth rate of GDP are harder to explain. The model explains nearly half 
the variation in real GDP; the political variables have little influence on measured economic 
variables. Neither reforms nor history seem to matter much in explaining variations in measured 
GDP growth. Though reforms have a modest positive effect on income, votes for reform have a 
modest negative effect. Neither vote nor reform is statistically significant. Only lagged growth in 
real GDP has a positive and significant correlation with the growth rate of real GDP. This 
suggests inertia in the income figures. Contemporary inflation is negatively correlated with 
growth in real GDP, a sensible result. Recall our belief that economic variables are probably 
rather unreliable. Also, they are being reported for highly unstable periods. This project suggests 
the importance of serious revisions of economic data from new market economies. Still, even if 
the economic data do not reflect actual performance, these figures can influence policy. A 
disconnect between adoption of painful reforms and measured economic success can deflate 
reform efforts. 
Two-stage least squares results 
Table 12 contains results from two-stage least squares estimation models to determine the 
effect on reforms of votes for reformers. Equation system (9) is the model we are estimating. We 
estimated several different versions of the model to check for robustness of the results.   
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There are two sets of results presented in Table 12. The first row equation estimates the 
coefficient of Vote from predetermined and exogenous variables of the system: Reformt-1, 
Bulgaria, Inflationt-1. We estimated several different versions of this equation. For instance, the 
second set of results in Table 12 excludes Bulgaria from the first equation. We also replaced 
Inflationt-1 with Incomet-1 and tested for serial correlation with Inflationt-2 and Incomet-2. These 
variables added nothing to the equation. We repeat that the income data again seems to contain 
severe measurement error. Nonetheless, the results for the second stage estimator of the over-
identified coefficient in the reform equation were the same for all variants of the model. 
Recall that in the second stage, the stage I estimators of Vote (or Vote*) replace the variable 
Vote in the reform equation. The coefficient of Vote* indicates that an increase in the vote 
received by reform parties tends to lead to a nearly proportional increase in the rate of reforms. 
The Hausman tests indicate that simultaneous equation bias was present for the vote 
variable. Hausman test 1 involves testing whether the coefficients on Vote* and Error* are the 
same. We cannot reject the null that they are the same indicating bias. Hausman test 2 amounts to 
the null hypothesis that, with bias, the coefficient on Error* is zero. We cannot reject this null. 
These tests hold for all variations in the model specification. These coefficient estimates are .93 
to .95 for the effect of votes on reform. (These are the last two equations of each set in Table 12.) 
The second stage of the two-stage process provides an estimate of about .93 for the 
coefficient capturing the effect on reform of votes for reformers. Table 9 indicated coefficients 
for this variable between .7 and .8. All of these estimators of the unknown α13 in the third 
equation of system (9) are all close to but less than 1. We conclude that reform policy response is 
nearly proportional to votes for reformers. This result indicates that the political system is quite 







                             Table 12: Two-stage least squares estimation 
                                Model  Vote           = V[ Reformt-1 , Bulgaria, Economicst-1] 
                                             Economics = E[Reformt-1, History, Economicst-1] 
                                             Reform      = R[Vote, History] 
                                                                  Stage I  
                    Vote  =  -.1300  +  .445 Reformt-1  +  11.257 Bulgaria  -  .020 Inflationt-1 
                                  (.006)     (2.240)                       ( 1.870)                   (2.781)  
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .3450     F-statistic = 2.161          R-bar
2 = .2957 
             Inflation  =  -1499  +  15.82 Reform  –  367.8 History  +  .764 Inflationt-1 
                                (2.219)    (2.422)               (2.435)                 (3.997)  
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .5002     F-statistic = 6.005          R-bar
2 = .4288 
                                                                Stage II 
                Reform  =  58.925  +  .9330 Vote*  +  15.255 History 
                                   (4.836)    (3.603)                (4.619) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .6154     F-statistic = 15.203        R-bar
2 = .5568 
                                                      Hausman test 1 
                Reform  =  57.641  +  .9490 Vote*  +  16.776 History  +  .6326 Error* 
                                 (7.240)     ( 5.611)                (7.705)                  (5.152) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8446     F-statistic = 32.612        R-bar
2 = .7239 
                                                      Hausman test 2 
                 Reform  =  57.641  +  .9490 Vote    +  16.776 History   -  .3164 Error* 
                                 (7.240)     ( 5.611)                (7.705)                  (1.527) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8446     F-statistic = 32.612        R-bar
2 = .7239 
 
                                                  Model without Bulgaria 
                                                            Stage I   
                   Vote  =  21.483  +  .254 Reformt-1  -  .017 Inflationt-1 
                                  (1.146)     (1.403)                     (2.250) 0 
                  n=22     df = 19        R
2 = .2177     F-statistic = 2.644          R-bar
2 = .1970 
                                                            Stage II  
                Reform  =  59.608  +  .9298 Vote*  +  13.783 History 
                                   (3.571)    (2.577)                (3.770) 
                  n=22     df = 19        R
2 = .5203     F-statistic = 10.305        R-bar
2 = .4708 
                                                      Hausman test 1 
                Reform  =  58.471  +  .9332 Vote*  +  16.482 History  +  .6852 Error* 
                                 (5.790)     ( 4.276)                (7.295)                  (5.825) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8337     F-statistic = 30.087        R-bar
2 = .7146 
                                                      Hausman test 2 
                 Reform  =  58.471  +  .9332 Vote    +  16.482 History   -  .2480 Error* 
                                 (5.790)     ( 4.276)                (7.295)                  (1.002) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8337     F-statistic = 30.087        R-bar
2 = .7146 
Vote* is the estimated vote from the stage I vote equation. Error* is the error from the stage I 








The dependent variable in the vote equation in stage I is the percent of the vote received by 
reformers. As a percent it cannot be distributed as normal. Even though most observations are far 
from the likely tails of the distribution, we transformed Vote using a logit model. These results 
are presented in Table 13. The confirm results from Table 12.  The logit model Hausman tests 
confirm simultaneous equation bias of the vote coefficient in the reform equation. The effect on 
reform of votes for reformers is still close to but less than one, around .94. 
 
                                 Table 13: Logit analysis with two-stage least squares 
                                Model  [ln (Vote/1-Vote)] =  V[ Reformt-1 , Bulgaria, Economicst-1] 
                                             Economics           =  E[Reformt-1, History, Economicst-1] 
                                             Reform                =  R[Vote, History] 
                                                                  Stage I  
                    Logit-Vote  =  -2.0650  +  .018 Reformt-1  +  .474 Bulgaria  -  .001 Inflationt-1 
                                            (2.312)     (2.171)                    ( 1.857)            (2.793)  
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .3437     F-statistic = 3.143          R-bar
2 = .2946 
                                                                Stage II 
                Reform  =  59.912  +  .9155 Vote**  +  15.287 History 
                                   (5.006)    (3.587)                 (4.618) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .6140     F-statistic = 15.113        R-bar
2 = .5555 
                                                      Hausman test 1 
                Reform  =  58.003  +  .9424 Vote**  +  16.788 History  +  .6336 Error** 
                                 (7.420)     ( 5.656)                (7.703)                  (5.160) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8443     F-statistic = 32.540        R-bar
2 = .7237 
                                                      Hausman test 2 
                 Reform  =  58.003  +  .9424 Vote    +  16.788 History   -  .3088 Error** 
                                 (7.240)     ( 5.656)                (7.703)                  (1.515) 
                  n=22     df = 18        R
2 = .8443     F-statistic = 32.540        R-bar
2 = .7237 
Vote** is the predicted vote computed from the anti-log of the stage – I vote equation. Error** is the error 
from the stage – I vote equation transformed to be comparable to Vote**. The t-statistics are in parentheses 
beneath the coefficients. 
 
 
8. Conclusions and recommendations 
We conclude with the key points we draw from the empirical analysis. 
•  Voting for reform parties does result in reforms. Votes for reform parties tend to lead to 
nearly proportional increases in the reform indexes. This result holds up for a variety of 
functional forms, for nearly all countries and for a variety of specifications and data measures. 
Socialist and agrarian parties are slower to adopt reforms than are European liberals.  
 
40 
•  History matters. Voters are less likely to endorse reformers in both Russia and 
Hungary. This is consistent with our hypothesis that countries that had enjoyed relatively good 
economic performance under homegrown communist leaders have a more difficult time adopting 
capitalist rules through reform. We found no empirical evidence that history before communism 
made a significant difference in voting behavior, adoption of reforms or measured economic 
performance. We conclude from these observations that countries without past experience with 
capitalism can achieve reform. However, to the extent they are unwilling to abandon the old ways 
or unable to constrain socialist impulses, transition to capitalism will be difficult, contentious and 
slow. 
•  Economic variables for inertia, inflation and income are negatively correlated. The 
economic data do not support the view that reforms improve economic performance quickly. 
While one may suspect this result, it does not augur well for reform. This increases political 
pressure on reform advocates. 
•  With the possible exception of inflation figures, economic performance variables are poor 
quality. International and national statistical agencies should shore up these data, so analysts can 
get a more accurate picture of the transition process.  
 
The problems with economic data are severe and important. Errors in the data may reflect 
obfuscation on the part of national statistical agencies, practices that were common under 
communist rule. Such practices may still take place. But even in countries with conscientious and 
honest statistical agencies, meaningful measures of economic performance are not available. 
These can be attributed to several well-known measurement problems in compiling statistical 
aggregates. But, while well known among western measurement specialists, these problems are 
more severe in transition economies and can lead to serious distortions of the transformation 
process. These distortions can work against attempts to reform these economies.  
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Specific measurement problems that require attention are an overemphasis on the costs 
of the decline in state owned enterprises. This reflects the relative ease of obtaining nominal 
output data from these sources and the failure to measure adequately the usually poor quality of 
the output these firms had been producing. The quality of output was poor both in terms of 
physical characteristics of the goods themselves and in terms of the market values of these goods 
in the post cold war environment. Many state enterprises were producing shoddy goods for 
markets that were not there. 
A second problem, the flip side of the first, is inattention to the importance in early transition 
of do-it-yourself, trade-out, and small-scale gray market production.  Many small entrepreneurial 
enterprises in the transition stage are extra-market. People take on second jobs, work for one 
another without formal compensation, build additions to their homes for rentals and undertake 
numerous other activities that are inadequately captured by statistical agencies. There may well 
be a buzz of economic activity that is replacing the failing and wasteful production of the 
dinosaurs, the large-scale state owned enterprises.  
International statistical agencies could serve a constructive role for transition economies by 
sending in measurement teams to produce viable data for economic performance. Data collection 
and analysis may serve a more important role than traditional research efforts when major shocks 




                              Table 14.  Some key reform dates 
                                            Price liberalization   
      Bulgaria  Czech R.  Estonia  Hungary  Russia***  Slovak 
R.  
Initial effort  1991  1991  1990  1968  1/1992*  1991 
Progress   *  *  *  41%-87    1999 
        62%-89     
        77%-90     
        85%-99     
                                                Privatization  
 Initial effort    1992  1991  1991  1982  11/1992  1991 
  18%-‘97           
 Major progress  12/1998  1992   1992  10/1989  93-33%  1998 
  70%        6/1994   
          5-6/1997   
Vouchers  1997-98  1992 W I  10/1994    10/1992  1992 
Setback   1995-6  1994 W II  3/1995  7/1994  Stop 94/5  9/1995 
        1/1996     
                                                  Stabilization   
Two-tier banking     1/1990  1991  1987     1/1990 
Tax reform  1997/98  1993  1994    1990 VAT  1/1996 
VAT 
Fiscal reform  1998    1992  12/1995    9/1990 
          Pensions         1997-98     
Currency reform  1991  9/1990  1992  1995  7/1993  1995 
Currency board  7/1997    6/1992       
Serious setback  1994-96  5/1997  11/1992    10/1994   1996-97 
  Ponzi  1995-97      1/1996   
Tightened budget  1998          1998 
Stock exchange  1992  1993  5/1996  5/1990    1993 
                                                  Trade liberalization   
EU—first tranche     1999  1999  1999       
EU Associate  1995  ?  ?  1992    ? 
Liberalize effort    1991  12/1991  1982     
Setback  1996-97        1995-97  7/1994 
IMF**  3/1997 M  1990 M  5/1992M   1982 L  6/1992 M  3/1994 L 
Setback  1996  5/1997       On/off 
reforms 
1996-97 
WTO  1996  1995    1995  1995  1/1995 
OECD    12/1995    5/1996     
Foreign div. invest. ↑  1998      2xCzech     
                                           Deregulation –restructuring  





         
Dump Soviet planning          10/1990   
Cut $ off ministries          11/1991   
 Bankruptcy Laws  1994   1991/93  1992  1/1992  1992/98  1991/93 
  **Zunk 
(junk 
bonds) 
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